Paper
This report, authored by Aileen Teague (Assistant Professor, Texas A&M) and Peyton McGuire (Adjunct Professor, Georgia Gwinnett College), examines how U.S. security assistance to Mexico of more than $3.3 billion between 2008 and 2021, through the Mérida Initiative, became embedded within and reinforced Mexico’s broader militarized counternarcotics strategy and evaluates the costs associated with that strategy during the Mérida period.
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A soldier stands guard by a charred vehicle after it was set on fire in Cointzio, Michoacán state, Mexico, Feb. 22, 2026, following the death of the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, Nemesio Oseguera, also known as "El Mencho." (AP Photo/Armando Solis, File)
The U.S.’ role as a major consumer market for illicit drugs, its longstanding influence in shaping Mexico’s prohibitionist enforcement strategies, and the substantial aid it has provided to support Mexico’s security apparatus have collectively bound Washington to the trajectory of the drug war.
Some of the human, economic and political costs of the militarized counternarcotics strategy include:
- Homicide rates rose more than threefold between 2006 and 2020, following the escalation of the drug war. Meanwhile, reported femicides increased from 427 in 2015 to 1,004 in 2021, representing a 135% increase.
- A 2026 report by the Council on Foreign Relations, citing data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), indicates that the total homicides in Mexico since 2006 have exceeded 460,000, a reflection of the persistence and scale of violence. Civilians have borne the overwhelming share of this violence.
- Violence imposed an economic burden of approximately $192.6 billion in 2021 alone—equivalent to about 14.6% of Mexico’s GDP—with more recent assessments placing the total closer to 18% of GDP, or roughly $230-250 billion annually. Impunity for violent crimes reached roughly 94.8% by 2021, while broader data suggest that over 90% of crimes in Mexico go unreported or unpunished, reflecting deep judicial and administrative deficiencies that limited the state’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and deter organized crime.
- Judicial and policing institutions have struggled to absorb the pressures generated by escalating violence. At the territorial level, institutional gaps have translated into uneven or contested state authority. In some regions, criminal groups exercise de facto control over territory, regulating economic activity, coercing local populations, and influencing political processes.
This report is released in collaboration with the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School (Tufts University).